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1 Introduction to quantum cryptography
Quantum cryptography is a method for providing two parties who want to communicate
securely with a secret key to be used in established protocols of classical cryptography. For
more reviews of this topic see [1, 2, 3]. Bennett and Brassard showed that it is possible,
at least ideally, to create a secret key, shared by sender and receiver, without both parties
sharing any secret beforehand. We refer to this protocol as the BB84 protocol. [4] To
achieve this goal, sender and receiver are linked by two channels. The first channel is
a public channel. The information distributed on it is available to both parties and to
a potential eavesdropper. To demonstrate the principle of quantum cryptography we
assume that the signals on this channel can not be changed by third parties. The second
channel is a channel with strong quantum features. An eavesdropper can interact with the
signal in an effort to extract information about the signals. The signal states are chosen
in such a way that there is always, on average, a back reaction onto the signal states. We
assume the quantum channel to be noiseless and perfect so that the back reaction of the
eavesdropper’s activity manifests itself as an induced error rate in the signal transmission.
The BB84 protocol uses the polarisation states of single photons as signal states. The
signal states are, for example, linear vertical or horizontal polarised photons or right or
left circular polarised photons. The sender sends a sequence of single photons with a
polarisation chosen randomly from the four given ones. The receiver uses randomly one
out of two given polarisation analysers for each signal photon. One of the analysers distin-
guishes between the two linear polarisations, the other between the circular polarisations.
Therefore the sequence of signals contains two types of transmissions. In the first type the
photon is prepared in a polarisation state which the polarisation analyser, chosen by the
receiver, is able to distinguish unambiguously. An example is that a horizontal polarised
photon is sent and the receiver chooses to use the linear polarisation analyser. Signals
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of this type will be refered to as deterministic signals since, the outcome of the polarisa-
tion measurement is fully determined by the state of the signal photon. The remaining
signals are non-deterministic signals. An example for this is a horizontal linear polarised
photon which triggers with equal probability the outcome “right circular” and “left circu-
lar” in the polarisation analyser distinguishing in the circular polarisation basis. Sender
and receiver can distinguish between deterministic and non-deterministic signals using
the public channel without giving away any information about the specific signal. They
just compare the polarisation basis of the signal and the measuring polarisation analyser,
both of which can be “linear” or “circular”. The signal sequence of the deterministic
bits can then be transformed into a binary key by assigning “0” for linear horizontal or
right circular polarised photons and “1” for the remaining linear vertical or left circular
polarised photons.
In this idealisation the security of quantum cryptography is given by the fact that the
four polarisation states are not four orthogonal states and so there exists no quantum non-
demolition measurement which could distinguish between them. Even more importantly,
each attempt to distinguish between any of the states will change, in average, the states
of the signals. This state-change destroys the perfect correlation between the signal and
the measurement outcomes for the deterministic signals. A test checking this correlation
will reveal any attempt at eavesdropping. If the test shows that the correlation is still
perfect then sender and receiver can be sure that there was no eavesdropping attack and
their shared binary key is perfectly secret.
In the practical realisation of quantum cryptography we face two specific problems.
The public channel needs to be implemented in such a way that sender and receiver can
ensure that the messages being received are really coming from each other. This is the
problem of authentication for which various techniques are in use. In general, however,
there will be the need for the two parties to share a limited amount of secret knowledge,
for example in form of a secret key, before the authentication can take place. Quantum
cryptography then generates a large secret key from a small secret key.
The work presented here deals with the second problem arising from the fact that all
realistic quantum channels are noisy. Therefore the correlation between the signals and
the measurement outcomes for the deterministic signals will not be perfect. Noise has the
same effect on the signals as the activity of an eavesdropper. It is therefore necessary to
think of all state change of the signals to be due to eavesdropping activity. It is intuitively
clear that an eavesdropper can only have gained a small amount of information on the key
if the correlation tested by sender and receiver are still strong, that is, if there are only a
few transmission errors for the deterministic signals. One can hope to give a bound on the
eavesdropper’s Shannon information as a function of the error rate in the deterministic
signals. Such bounds have been obtained assuming that the eavesdropper is restricted to
von Neumann measurements only [5] or to a restricted class of more general measurements
[6]. Here we present a sharp bound [7, 8] on the Shannon information of an eavesdropper
which is valid for all eavesdropping attacks which access each signal photon independently
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of each other. It therefore does not include coherent attacks in which the product state
of all signal photons is attacked. The sharp bound does not take into account that an
eavesdropper can make use of the later acquired knowledge about the polarisation basis
of the signal photons to change the measurement of the signal. However, we are able to
give a rough upper bound for this situation. The reason that this is possible is that the
eavesdropper has to decide how to interact with the signal states before he acquires the
additional knowledge about the polarisation basis.
2 Generalised measurements
The key input to derive the bounds given in this paper is the most general description of a
measurement on a given system. Any measurement can be described by a set of operators
Al defined on the Hilbert space H of the system the measurement is performed on. The
only restriction on the operators is that
∑
l∈K
A
†
lAl = 1H . (1)
where K is some finite or countable infinite index set. The link between these operators
and a measurement is given by the following formulas which describe the probabilities
that a particular outcome of a measurement is triggered, and which give the final state
of the measured system after that outcome was registered. For the sake of simplicity we
assume the set of outcomes to be discrete. The probability that the outcome k is triggered
by an input state with density matrix ρ is given by
pk = TrH

ρ ∑
l∈Kk
A
†
lAl

 (2)
where the Kk are disjunct subsets of K with K =
⋃
kKk. The final density matrix ρ˜
(k) of
the selected states belonging to this outcome is given by
ρ˜(k) =
∑
l∈Kk AlρA
†
l
TrH
(
ρ
∑
l∈Kk A
†
lAl
) . (3)
The density matrix of the final state, which does not select any states, but describes the
whole ensemble for all outcomes is given by
ρ˜ =
∑
k
pkρ˜
(k) =
∑
l∈K
AlρA
†
l . (4)
It is important to choose the correct Hilbert space H to describe the measurement. To
describe a spin measurement of an electron and the back reaction onto that spin we will
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chooseH to be the Hilbert space of the spin of electron. If we are interested in the position
or momentum of the electron as well we have to add the Hilbert space of spatial modes. It
is a bit less obvious in quantum optics. If H is the one-photon polarisation Hilbert space
then we implicitly assume that precisely one photon remains after the measurement. An
eavesdropper may absorb the photon and so the final state is the vacuum. Therefore the
adequate Hilbert space is the full Hilbert space of a light mode plus the polarisation degree
of freedom. It turns out that we can derive the bounds presented here by restricting the
Hilbert space to that of a single photon and later generalise it to the full Hilbert space.
3 Estimate of the Shannon information
The relevant expression for the Shannon information per signal is given with the help of
the function h(x) = −x log x, where log refers to basis 2, as
I =
∑
Ψ=0,1
h [p(Ψ)] +
∑
α=◦,+
k
h [p(kα)]−
∑
Ψ=0,1
k,α
h [p(Ψ, kα)] . (5)
An eavesdropper gains this Shannon information on the binary key whose signals are given
by Ψ = 0, 1 when he learns, from communication on the public channel, the polarisation
basis α = ◦,+ (linear or circular) used for each signal, and registers the outcome k on
the measurement apparatus triggered by each signal. The probabilities that a “0” or a
“1” is sent are denoted by p(Ψ), the probability that outcome k is triggered by a photon
prepared as basis state of the linear or circular polarisation basis is written as p(kα), and
the joint probability distribution for both events is p(Ψ, kα).
We would like to give an upper bound on this Shannon information as a function of the
measured disturbance of the quantum channel given as the error rate in the deterministic
signals. This error rate is basically the fidelity measure Dfid of the channel, given by
Dfid = 1− 1
4
4∑
j=1
TrH (ρiρ˜i) . (6)
The definition of Dfid assumes here the use of the one photon polarisation Hilbert space.
The expression TrH (ρiρ˜i) is the overlap between the input state ρi, which is one of the
four signal states, and the final state ρ˜i of the eavesdropper’s measurement performed on
this input state ρi. This can be interpreted as the probability that the final state is still
recognised as the initial state in apparatus of the receiver. Then Dfid is the error rate
averaged over the four signal states.
It can be shown [8] that the optimal eavesdropping strategy can be given by operators
Ak which can be described by real matrices in a representation for which the signal states
are real density matrices. Each operator Ak, which can always be expressed in the form
Ak =
√
akOk +
(√
bk −√ak
)
OkPk (7)
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with real, positive numbers ak and bk, (bk ≥ ak), projection operators Pk and orthogonal
operators Ok. The optimal strategy satisfies the symmetry that for each such operator
the set of operators Ak contains as well the operator
A˜k =
√
akOk +
(√
bk −√ak
)
OkP (8)
which employs the orthogonal complement P = 1H − Pk. The optimal eavesdropping
strategy associates a measurement outcome with each of the operators Ak separately so
that we do not need to employ any partitions K(k). For such an eavesdropping strategy
the measured disturbance Dfid is given by
Dfid =
∑
i
[
1
4
TrH (ρiEi)−
∑
k∈K
(
1
4
√
akbkTrH
(
OkρiO
T
kEi
)
+
1
4
(√
bk −√ak
)2
2
(
TrH
(
OkPkρiPkO
T
kEi
)
+ TrH
(
OkP kρiP kO
T
kEi
)))]
.
Here Ei is the projection operator describing the effect of the polarisation analyser. For
the one photon space we have Ei = ρi. The Shannon information is given by the expression
I =
∑
k
ak+bk
2
[
1− log(1 + η2k)+
1
2(1+η2
k
)
{
(η2k + ck − η2kck) log(η2k + ck − η2kck)
+(1− ck + η2kck) log(1− ck + η2kck)
+(η2k + dk − η2kdk) log(η2k + dk − η2kdk)
+(1− dk + η2kdk) log(1− dk + η2kdk)
}]
.
(9)
In this expression we used the definitions of the overlaps ck = TrH (ρ1Pk) and dk =
TrH (ρ3Pk) and of the characteristic parameters ηk =
√
ak
bk
with η ∈ [0, 1]. For ηk = 1
an operator Ak takes the characteristics of the identity operator, which corresponds to
non-interference of the eavesdropper, and for ηk = 0 the eavesdropping strategy tends to
a von Neumann projection measurement. The overlaps are restricted by the inequality
(dk − 1
2
)2 + (ck − 1
2
)2 ≤ 1
4
. (10)
We can find the optimal choice of orthogonal operatorsOk and Pk. The optimal choices
are given in a later section. As a result we find now for the disturbance the inequality
Dfid ≥
∑
k∈K
ak + bk
2
1
4
(1− ηk)2
1 + η2k
. (11)
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Note that the condition (1) implies that
∑
k
ak + bk
2
= 1 (12)
so that the expressions ak+bk
2
have the property of a probability. The Shannon information
can be estimated by
I ≤∑
k
ak + bk
2
1
2
(
1− log(1 + η2k) +
η2k
1 + η2k
log η2k
)
. (13)
It can be shown that the optimal choice of the characteristic parameters ηk is for them
to take the same value η˜. The proof uses variation methods. Then we find the inequalities
Dfid ≥ 1
4
(1− η˜)2
1 + η˜2
(14)
I ≤ 1
2
(
1− log(1 + η˜2) + η˜
2
1 + η˜2
log η˜2
)
. (15)
If we actually measure the average error rate Dfid and find the value Dm we can bound
the value of η˜ by
η˜ ≥ η :=


1−2
√
2
√
(1−2Dm)Dm
1−4Dm Dm ≤ 14
0 Dm ≥ 14
(16)
which leads to the bound of the eavesdropper’s Shannon information [7, 8] as
IS ≤ 1
2
(
1− log(1 + η2) + η
2
1 + η2
log η2
)
. (17)
It can be shown that this bound can be further estimated by the linear bound
I ≤ 2
ln 2
Dm (18)
where ln 2 is the natural logarithm of 2. For small Dm this bound is nearly as good as
the bound (17) which will later be shown to be sharp. The sharp bound and the linear
approximation are plotted in figure 3 as a function of the measured fidelity disturbance.
Typical values for experimental realisations using the BB84 protocol achieve an error rate
of 4 % for 30 km or 1.5 % for 10 km distance between sender and receiver.
4 Privacy amplification
For the purpose of secret communication the amount of Shannon information possibly
leaked to an eavesdropper according to the previous estimate is far to high. However,
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Figure 1: The bound on the Shannon information in the sharp (continuous
line) and the linear bound (dashed line) as a function of the measured distur-
bance Dm.
making use of the technique of privacy amplification [9] it is possible to reduce Eve’s
total amount of Shannon information on the remaining key. For that the key has to be
shortened using hash functions. The characteristic quantity for the fraction by which the
key has to be shortened is the parameter τ1. If we shorten the key by the fraction τ1
then the eavesdropper is left at most with a Shannon information of 1 bit on the whole
key. Each bit by which the key is is shortened additionally decreases this remaining
Shannon information exponentially. The parameter τ1 can be expressed with the help of
the collision probability 〈pc(y)〉y as
τ1 = 1 + log 〈pc(y)〉
1
N
y . (19)
The collision probability 〈pc(y)〉y =
∑
x p(x|y)2 refers to the probability distribution p(x|y)
over all possible signal string x, conditioned on the event that the eavesdropper measured
a particular string of measurement results y.
Before they can apply the technique of privacy amplification, the sender and the
receiver have to perform some type of error correction on their shared key. We assume that
this process can be done without the eavesdropper gaining any additional knowledge and
without the creation of any correlations between the signals. A possible realisation would
be to use block parity comparison where the compared parity bit is encoded using some
short shared secret key from the same source which gives the key used in the authentication
of the public channel. In this case the collision probability is given by
〈pc(y)〉
1
n =
∑
k,α,ψ
p(c) (ψ, kα)
2
p(c) (kα)
, (20)
where the probabilities p(c) (ψ, kα) and p
(c) (kα) now refer to the corrected key, and it
takes only those signal transmissions which were correctly received into account. The
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joint probability distribution p(c) (ψ, kα) is given, with a normalisation constant C, by
p(c) (ψ, kα) =
1
C
TrH
(
AkρψαA
†
kρψα
)
. (21)
It is again possible to show general properties of the Ak which lead to an optimal
information gain by the eavesdropper, along with minimal disturbance of the signal trans-
mission. The optimal Ak can be shown to be real (in the real representation of the signal
states) and to consist of symmetric or anti-symmetric matrices. The symmetric matrices
can have eigenvalues of different or of the same sign so that they can be written as
A
(±)
k =
√
ak1H −
(√
ak ±
√
bk
)
Pk (22)
with the ak and bk satisfying, as before, bk ≥ ak ≥ 0 and Pk is a projection operator. To
each such operator the set of operators Ak contains an operator
A˜
(±)
k =
√
ak1H −
(√
ak ±
√
bk
)
Pk (23)
using the orthonormal complement Pk = 1H − Pk. I refrain from giving to give the
expressions for the collision probability and the disturbance Dfid in the general form and
give instead the forms optimised with respect to the choice of projection operators Pk. At
this stage they are given with the help of the characteristic parameter ηk which satisfies
η2k =
ak
bk
and takes values in the range ηk ∈ [−1, 1] which is in contrast to the calculations
leading to the bound on the Shannon information. The disturbance satisfies the inequality
Dfid =
∑
k∈K(±)
ak + bk
2
1
4
(ηk − 1)2
η2k + 1
+
∑
k∈K(a)
ak + bk
2
1
4
. (24)
where K(±) is the index set of the symmetric operators and K(a) the index set of the
anti-symmetric operators. The collision probability is bound by
〈
p(c)c (y)
〉 1
n ≤
∑
k
ak + bk
2
1
2
1
1 + η2k
17 + 12ηk + 6η
2
k + 12η
3
k + 17η
4
k
3 + 2ηk + 3η2k∑
k
ak + bk
2
3 + 2ηk + 3η
2
k
1 + η2k
. (25)
We use again a variation method to show that the optimal eavesdropping strategy
employs characteristic parameters ηk with the same value η˜. Also it is clear that it is of
disadvantage to the eavesdropper to use anti-symmetric operators Ak. This leads to the
estimates
Dfid ≥ 1
4
∑
k∈K
(η˜ − 1)2
η˜2 + 1
(26)
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and 〈
p(c)c (y)
〉 1
N ≤ 1
2
17 + 12η˜ + 6η˜2 + 12η˜3 + 17η˜4
(3 + 2η˜ + 3η˜2)2
. (27)
The measured disturbance Dm leads to a bound on η˜ given by
η˜ ≥ η :=


1−2√2
√
(1−2Dm)Dm
1−4Dm Dm ≤ 12−1 Dm ≥ 12
. (28)
This finally allows us to bound the parameter τ1 (19) by the inequality [8]
τ1 ≤


log
(
17+12η+6η2+12η3+17η4
(3+2η+3η2)
2
)
Dm ≤ 13
1 1
3
≤ Dm ≤ 1
(29)
This bound is shown in figure 4. Typical error rates in the BT experiment are e ∈
[0.01, 0.05] which corresponds to τ1 ∈ [0.05, 0.26].
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Figure 2: The parameter τ1 as a function of the error rate. The error rate e
is equal to the disturbance measure Dfid.
5 Validity of the bounds
The derivation of the bounds presented above assumes that the eavesdropper interacts
with the signal photons but does not absorb them. In the experimental realisation, how-
ever, an absorption of about 90 % is observed. The validity of the bounds can be extended
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to accommodate the possibility of absorption by re-defining the average error rate as refer-
ing only to those signals where the polarisation analyser successfully measured a signal.
It can be shown that the eavesdropper cannot increase the trade-off between information
and induced error rate by forwarding signal states to the receiver which contain more
than one photon. The basic tool for this extension of the validity of the bounds is that
one can show that each eavesdropper strategy is equivalent to an eavesdropper strategy
which results in final states which are Fock states of fixed photon number.
6 Delayed measurements
The description of a delayed measurement needed here is that the eavesdropper has effec-
tively two eavesdropping strategies at hand: one for each signal set of linear or circular
polarisation. They are given by the A-operators {Ak}k∈K and {Bl}l∈L with two index
sets K and L which are not necessarily of the same size. The strategies cannot be chosen
independently of each other since they must be alternative descriptions of the quantum
channel viewed as a non-selective measurement. This means that the equality
∑
k∈K
AkρA
†
k =
∑
l∈L
BlρB
†
l (30)
must hold for all density matrices ρ. An example of relations between the sets {Ak}k∈K
and {Bl}l∈L satisfying this equality is the choice Bl =
∑
k clkAk with
∑
k clkckn = δln.
One can give a crude estimate of the Shannon information and of the collision probability
because the disturbance is independent of the overlaps ck and dk. To give the bounds let
the eavesdropper choose the projection operators Pk of the set of operators Ak and Bk
independently. Quantum mechanics will put some restrictions on that relation so that
the resulting bounds are no longer sharp. Thus the eavesdropper’s Shannon information
may increase by a factor 2. The collision probability is bounded by
〈
p(c)c (y)
〉 1
n ≤ 1 + η˜
4
(1 + η˜2)2
(31)
where η˜ is bounded by the measured disturbance Dfid as given in (28). The resulting
bound for the fraction τ1 of bits to be discarded during privacy amplification is plotted in
figure 6. In this estimate we can prove security against eavesdropping as long as the error
rate is less than 25 %. This result is likely to remain valid if we allow n-photon operations
as in the previous chapter. Formal proof, however, should be postponed until a sharp
bound for delayed choice eavesdropping strategies can be given. Clearer understanding of
the restrictions imposed by (30) is essential for the derivation of the sharp bound.
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Figure 3: The crude bound of the fraction τ1 of bits to be discarded during
privacy amplification allowing for delayed measurements (solid line). This is
compared to the sharp bound for non-delayed measurements (dashed line).
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